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LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
ARGENTINE JURISPRUDENCE:
THE PARKE DAVIS AND DELTEC CASES
MICHAEL W. GORDON*
Two decisions of the Supreme Court of Argentina in 1973 adjudicated
several interesting issues which, with the addition of subsequent legisla-
tion, affect investors receiving royalty payments from Argentine holdings
and, of greater impact, challenge both the separate identity of parents and
subsidiaries as well as the individuality of different subsidiaries of the
same foreign parent. The judicial decisions have since been further
confirmed by legislation, although the concept of fusing lawfully chartered
separate business entities under a theory of an economic unit is not to be
welcomed by the investment sector. 2 The theory possesses some parallels
to the United States concept of piercing the corporate veil where one
corporation is the alter ego of another. The United States theory is
generally based on some fraudulent, or at least unfair, use of the corporate
entity.3 While the Argentine economic unit concept does not require the
establishment of any traditional wrongful purpose, it is imposed where
there is some undefined measure of economic or commercial dependence
by the subsidiary on the parent. The view is designed to obtain some
control over the foreign parent which controls the operations of the
subsidiary through the commercial relationships of the two entities, the
parent heretofore being free to conduct its relations with its subsidiary,
and consequently govern its operations, without submitting to any controls
of the host nation. The new view will not give the Argentine courts
jurisdiction over the foreign parent, but the effects may be significant
where the parent owns other subsidiaries in Argentina.
The two decisions involved, first, Parke Davis of Argentina and its
United States parent, Parke Davis of Detroit, and second, Comparfla
Swift de La Plata (Cia. Swift), the Argentine subsidiary of Deltec Inter-
national Limited, a multinational Bahamian based meat processing
company.
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THE PARKE DAVIS AND DELTEC CASES
In Parke Davis, decided in July, 1973, the Argentine Supreme Court
ruled that formerly deductible royalty payments paid by Parke Davis of
Argentina to Parke Davis of Detroit, owner of 99.95 percent of the stock,
were to be considered profits which were subject to corporate income
taxes. Argentina had previously interpreted its tax laws to define cash
payments for technical advice or services as royalties or service fees
subject to an income tax, but with a 20 percent allowance applied to the
gross due, in recognition of the nature of the expense as an obligation
due in return for the acquisition of the technical advice. The tax rate for
payments qualifying as royalties thus was effectively lower than applied
to repatriated profits and dividend payments.'
The justification for disallowing the deduction was not a total
judicial rejection of special treatment for royalty payments. It was rather
a challenge to the recognition of royalty status for payments by a
subsidiary to a parent. The tax authorities in Argentina had refused to
acknowledge that a traditional licensor/licensee relationship existed because
the subsidiary/licensee was economically dependent on the parent/licensor.
Had there been a clear diversity of ownership, the issue would not have
been raised. 6 Since the parent can control the subsidiary's operations, it
can dictate all of the terms of a technical services licensing agreement.
By requiring a very high royalty payment, a portion of the gross received
by the parent which is labelled as royalty payments may actually be a
profits remittance. The Argentine view ignores the fact that legitimate
licensing arrangements do take place between parents and subsidiaries;
the disallowance of all deductions from subsidiaries to parents does not
seem to be the most rational one. Where companies are unable to achieve
a resolution of the problem, such as through increased profits to make
up the difference, they may be unwilling to export their more valuable
technical properties, or may enter into some cross-agreement with other
companies to avoid the parent/subsidiary status.
7
The case reached the Supreme Court after the Tax Court upheld the
government's position in a 2-1 decision,' a ruling subsequently supported
by the Court of Appeals without dissent.9 The issue before the Supreme
Court was, as agreed to by Parke Davis in the Tax Court, the legal
justification for disallowing the deduction on economic unit grounds.
Parke Davis, perhaps foreseeing the further adoption of the economic
unit concept, and additionally aware of the greater hostilities involved in
the pending Cia. Swift case, emphasized in its defense the special status
granted to royalties for tax purposes, attempting to distinguish the tax
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area from other situations which might be more appropriate for the
application of the economic unit theory. This approach was unsuccessful.
Although focusing upon tax issues,"0 the Supreme Court developed the
economic unit doctrine. It first referred to the earlier Refinerlas de Malz
S.A. decision,1' establishing a parallel between that case, which involved
a sociedad de responsabilidad limitada with local and foreign members,' 2
where royalty deductions had been denied as being within the same
economic unit, and the current facts, involving a corporate structure with
shareholders in both the host and foreign nations. Establishing the
separate identity of shareholders of separate incorporated entities was not
relevant, particularly where the intent in forming the "independent" local
subsidiary is to obtain economic benefits for the multinational structure
as a whole. The Court ruled "economic reality" rather than structural
formalities to be the guide.
Rather than emphasizing the multinational control exercised from
abroad, the Court concentrated on the lack of an independent status of
Parke Davis of Argentina. The Court found that no recognizable licens-
ing agreement was actually in effect between Parke Davis of Argentina
and Parke Davis of Detroit, implying that Parke Davis of Argentina had
no power to even demand that the commercial relations between the
companies be reduced to written contracts, that any such contracts were
in fact part of the capital of the whole multinational structure and could
not be recognized as commercial relationships between independent
entities.
Almost as an afterthought, the Court referred to the application of
the theory of penetration, a view used to avoid abuses which may evolve
from the complexity of corporate structures. The Court was cognizant of
the increasing scope of the multinational enterprise and the "grave legal
problems which their expansion presents." The Cia Swift case was to
focus more strongly on this area, although also avoiding an in depth
analysis of the economic entity concept.
The effect of the decision as judicial precedent is limited; decisions
of the Supreme Court of Argentina apply only to the particular case
before the court. Any pronouncement by the Supreme Court, however,
has some tangible precedential value. Argentina, as other Latin American
nations, has developed the theory of jurisprudencia, whereby repeated
decisions on similar facts gain some persuasive standing. Indeed, the
Court in Parke Davis cited the previous ruling in Rejinerias de Maiz,
in support of its reasoning. Whatever precedential value the decision
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might have evinced, however, was diminished in importance by the
subsequent enactment of the investment law incorporating the Parke
Davis rationale.
The impact of Parke Davis is not as severe as the Comparzia Swilt
de La Plata decision, since there has long been a developing trend in
Argentina to reduce the distinction between repatriated profits by a
parent and other currency transfer methods which resulted in tax benefits
to the foreign entity. While the issue could have been resolved by
eliminating the fixed deduction for royalty remittances, the problem lay
with parent-subsidiary transfers, not with technology transfers. Indeed,
to eliminate royalty deduction preferences would be in direct conflict with
the acknowledged need for and desire to encourage increased transfers of
technology. The issue to be faced was rather the resolution of detrimental
effects to Argentina from the interrelationship of a parent and subsidiary,
where the parent's economic power over the subsidiary allows the former
to arrange its relationships with the latter to achieve the maximum
beneficial result for the shareholder of the parent. The dissallowance of
royalty payments was a not unexpected partial resolution of the overall
problem, although it might have been less unsettling to the business sector
had the matter waited for the expected legislative action. While the
royalty payment disallowal answered this one persistent problem with
predictable results, the Cia. Swift case was a far greater shock to the
foreign investment community as a whole, and clearly illustrated that the
concept of an economic unit has the potential for broader application
than was easily discernible from the Parke Davis decision.
Compaizia Swift de La Plata was the largest meatpacker in Argentina
and the major earner of foreign exchange through its substantial exports.
It was the largest subsidiary of Deltec International Limited. I" The
firm had spun-off its meat processing facilities in several nations, part
of a plan to obtain local equity participation in international subsidiaries.
Deltec was also intending to spin off Cia. Swift, particularly as it had
been unprofitable for years, paying neither dividends since 1962 nor
interest on obligations to the parent company since 1967. From 1969
until Cia. Swift petitioned for convocatoria in December, 1970,14 the
company experienced substantial business fluctuations, due primarily to
economic and political movements within Argentina. The Company was
unable to form a purchasing group of Argentine investors, a move in-
creasingly necessary as the Argentine government began to favor domestic
corporations through such actions as limiting credit to companies more
than 51 percent Argentine owned. Although Cia. Swift expected the
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convocatoria process to offer a sufficient resolution of its problems to
make the company more marketable, it was actually the beginning of a
complex series of conflicts within the Argentine judicial structure.
In the convocatoria proceedings, the presiding judge in the National
Commercial Court of Buenos Aires rejected the proferred concordato
after a small general creditor, alleging fraud and deceit, requested the
disallowance of all claims by other Deltec group companies," 5 and the
judge had determined that there was evidence that Cia. Swift was selling
products to other Deltec group companies at lower prices than offered
to other buyers. 16 The court appointed referee had valued the assets at
556,230,360 new Argentine pesos, listed 143,480,787.75 of liabilities,
and recommended the non-recognition of Deltec group claims on the
theory of "penetration of the corporate personality."17 The court had
earlier removed the Board of Directors and, along with denying claims
of the other Deltec group companies and rejecting the concordato, de-
creed Cia. Swift in bankruptcy and designated the Federal Government
as receiver-liquidator.18 Deltec International and other members of the
group appealed the order and asked for the removal of the lower court
judge for prejudice. The Court of Appeals denied the removal petition
and confirmed the bankruptcy on the grounds that the judge had broad
statutory authority to deny approval of the concordato in the "general
interest." The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court's rul-
ing which had extended liability to other Deltec group companies. The
decision was made on procedural grounds, essentially that those com-
panies had not had their day in court.1 9
The Court of Appeals next, sitting ea banc, affirmed its panel's
interpretation of "general interest," based primarily on the extensive
discretion granted to lower court judges in composition proceedings, rather
than a correct legal interpretation of the concept of an economic unit.
The Company then applied for a writ of error to the Supreme Court
charging that the bankruptcy ruling was arbitrary and in violation of
the due process provisions of the Argentine Constitution. While the case
was pending before the Supreme Court, another creditor petitioned to
the National Commercial Court judge to also rule bankrupt Deltec In-
ternational, Deltec Banking, and all companies in Argentine in which
Deltec or Cia. Swift possessed a significant interest. Service of process
was purportedly carried out by telegram to the foreign offices of Deltec
International and Deltec Banking. This new petition was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals shortly prior to the Supreme Court's final decision.
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The Court of Appeals ruled that a case involving the bankruptcy of one
corporation was not the proper proceeding in which to rule on the bank-
ruptcy of another corporation, and that the service of process on the
foreign corporations was invalid.
In September, 1973, the Supreme Court rendered its decision.20 The
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in so far as it had
upheld the lower court's determination of bankruptcy of Cia. Swift, but
reversed the Court of Appeals ruling exonerating Deltec International and
Deltec Argentina"1 from the "collective" bankruptcy decision of the Com-
mercial Court.22 The Supreme Court again used the economic unit theory,
finding the entire Deltec group to he a single economic enterprise.
The Supreme Court restated elements noted by the Court of Appeals
of the close relationship of the entities in the Deltec group as a whole, and
with Cia. Swift in particular. These included findings that more than
80 percent of Cla. Swift's sales were to group members, and that there
was a "tendency" to sell to non-group members at higher prices.23 Also
noted were financial transfers among the group to meet needs "in diffi-
cult moments." The Supreme Court found these facts inconsistent with the
Court of Appeals decision that other Deltec group members should not also
be adjudicated responsible, notwithstanding that the Court of Appeals
decision was based on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court did not
reach the day-in-court reasoning of the Court of Appeals. The fact that
Deltec International was a dominant factor in the governance of Ca.
Swift does not justify holding it liable for Cia. Swift's obligations with-
out its own opportunity to be heard. The Court was properly concerned,
however, with the Deltec group's possible abuses in using corporate
structures, although those abuses should have been the subject of a di-
rect attack, as held by the Court of Appeals.
2 4
The Supreme Court's own findings of the interrelationship of the
Deltec group do not necessarily lead to the conclusion of the presence
of abuses. It referred to Deltec International's annual report of 1970
which had commented on principles of consolidation of corporate ac-
tivities and the offering for sale of its subsidiary Cia. Swift. The Court
read more into the wholly owned subsidiary status than was appropriate.
It is not the organizational strata, but the substantive manner of utiliza-
tion of the strata which may justify an amalgamation of several cor-
porate entities. The Court made clear a sense of frustration over the
lack of national control over the multinational entity, where the power
is centralized abroad and the host nation of a subsidiary feels its im-
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pact, often to its detriment. The decision is a reaction to this frustration,
a rejection that only one member of the group should be responsible for
commercial liabilities when that entity "appears" subject to external
manipulation. The Court cited an earlier judicial declaration that "the
excessive attachment to legal traditionalism has been classified as one of
the most serious obstacles to the success of the promotion of economic
expansion and social justice," and observed that one should not confuse
principles of justice with judicial ritual. It would appear that any "ex-
cessive attachment" to legal traditions which are undermining a nation's
growth are appropriate subjects for legislative refutation. When the
traditions are not only long established, but have become norms the
rejection of which will have serious international implications, abrupt
judicial rejection does little to advance "economic expansion and social
justice."
While the Court found that the Deltec group's use of traditional con-
cepts of corporation strata was detrimental to the needs of the Argentine
society, it did not elucidate. No specific acts of any Deltec member were
tied to any identifiable damage to the Argentine economy.2 5 The Court's
inability to more clearly identify the abuses is noteworthy. It is a view
which raises a presumption of potential wrongdoing when there is an
economic unit, thus eliminating the need for proof of specific acts.
Yet, it is also further evidence of the sense of frustration in dealing
with the multinational entity, a reaction perhaps no less lacking in
specific reasoning than the world legislative organizations' identification
of the multinational corporation issues with no offer of control solutions.
The absence of clarity as to the structure of the Deltec group was
illustrated by the Court's remand of the proceeding to the Commercial
Court to determine which Deltec group entities should be included in
the responsible group. That determination was quickly made by the
earlier censured judge in the Commercial Court.26 Two days after the
Supreme Court decision, without the record of the Supreme Court and
without any evidence of serious consideration as to which companies were
within the scope of the Supreme Court pronouncement, the lower court
Judge ruled 13 Deltec group companies bankrupt.
Both of the above cases lack adequate analysis of the important
economic unit theory. This absence of analysis should not be justified
because of the traditional "conclusion oriented" mode of civil court de-
cisions. Those decisions are interpretive of specific laws, infrequently
containing more than a conclusion of a violation or compliance with a
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stated law. The Argentine cases, contrastingly, dealt with a concept not
codified in the Argentine law, nor clearly established in earlier judicial
decisions. Perhaps the disappointment this writer has in reading the
decision is that the economic unit theory offers substantial potential for
some measure of national control over multinational organizations. Con-
cepts of piercing the corporate veil or disregard of the corporate fiction
are familiar to United States corporate counsel. While normally decided
on the basis of the fraudulent utilization of the corporate form, United
States courts have also adopted an "instrumentality" or alter ego theory
to reach behind the fiction of corporate protection. The instrumentality
theory may or may not include fraud; it may be based on little more than
such domination of the subsidiary by the parent that the former has no
separate existence of its own, but is a mere puppet or tool. This concept
has been used,2 7 and criticized, 28 in the United States in a manner not
inappropriate to an analysis of the Argentine decisions. Yet the Argentine
situation poses a more frustrating task than the domestic setting, since
the nation of the subsidiary is unable effectively to reach the assets of
the parent. In the Ga. Swift litigation, however, the existence of other
Deltec group companies in Argentina brought within the control of the
Argentine authorities assets of the group in addition to those of the sub.
sidiary. Cia. Swilt. The decision, and the subsequent legislative adoption
of the economic unit theory, may discourage multinational corporations
from diversification of their activities within a particular nation.
The new Argentine foreign investment legislation, to be clarified with
new regulations in the Spring of 1974, considers all subsidiary to parent
transfers to be profits, and transfers from the parent to the subsidiary are
stipulated as contributions. The economic unit concept must be refined to
determine how extensive transfer restrictions will apply to mixed com-
panies, classified as those with between 51 and 80 percent local equity
participation. The law does apply to subsidiaries with majority foreign
ownership. Since the economic unit theory relies substantially on control
rather than ownership, it would appear that further "penetration" decisions
will be likely to involve entities where there is not only substantial equity
participation by the foreign organization, but such absolute control over
the operations of the host country entity that some viability is granted
to the economic unit theory. Presumably, further focusing upon this
theory will be directed toward the multinational entity with substantial
ownership interests in a host country entity and a clearly dominant
controlling role. The view represents a new direction of host country
nations in controlling the quality of foreign investment within their
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countries. If the practice becomes more widespread among individual
nations or, more importantly, if it is adopted on a regional level by
economically integrated areas, the economic unit theory may develop into
an important element of control over the multinational organization. There
are grantedly substantial problems of jurisdiction over foreign parents
and other members of a multinational group. The concept is nevertheless
one which must be unsettling to the centralized management of many
multinational organizations, where governance of the network of foreign
subsidiaries was believed to be partially premised on an internationally
accepted theory of liability limited to the traditional strata of corpora-
tions. The Argentine Supreme Court has at least loosened, if not removed,
a lower block in the pyramidal structure of multinational corporations
operating in Argentina.
NOTES
'P. 306. XVI. Parke Davis v. Cia. de Argentina S.A.I.C. s/ recurso de apelaci6n.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires, 31 Julio 1973. C-705-XVI.
Compafiia Swift de La Plata S.A., Frigorifica s/ convocatoria de acreedores. Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires, 4 Sept. 1973.
2The Argentine legislature passed a foreign investment law in early November of
1973, incorporating the economic unit concept and disallowing royalty payments
between a parent and subsidiary. Business Latin America, Nov. 14, 1973, p. 361. The
economic unit theory is intended to resolve cases when the subsidiary is not wholly
owned by the parent, essentially determining unity on the degree of commercial
reliance of the subsidiary on the parent. The law also includes allowance of govern-
ment intervention in certain sectors, with nationalization as a goal, and additionally
fade-out provisions and profit remittance limitations.
3See, e.g., Henn, Law of Corporations 250 (2d ed. 1970).
4 Deltec International Limited was formed by Deltec Panamerica, S.A., multina-
tional investment and merchant banker, and IPL, Inc., the successor of Swift Inter-
national, S.A., an Argentine incorporated holding company for Swift & Company's
international operations.
5While the rate of tax is the same in each case, the 20 percent deduction allowed
for royalty remittances resulted in a lower tax than for profits and dividends. Addi-
tionally, adding the royalty gross to profits and thus net worth, the corporation paid
a 1.5 percent substitutive inheritance tax on a larger base amount.
6The new law limits the disallowance of royalty payments to relations between
a parent and its subsidiary, not where there is a clear economic independence on the
part of the licensee obligated to pay royalties.
7Increasing profits will be difficult in Argentina: part of the new foreign invest-
ment law limits profit repatriation to 12.5 percent of registered capital, or four
percentage points above the current 180 day money lending rate in the currency in
which the foreign investment is made, whichever is greater.
The availability of a foreign tax credit to the United States companies reduces
the impact of the Court's ruling. Royalty payments are deducted only as ordinary ex-
penses, whereas foreign payments for income taxes receive a direct tax credit. The
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result is not a higher tax to the United States company, but a partial change in who
receives the tax, from the United States to Argentina.
8Parke Davis y Cia. de Argentina S.A.I.C. Tribunal Fiscal de la Naci6n, 14
Marto 1970, fallo C-420. XXI Derecho Fiscal 99.
9Parke Davis y Cia. de Argentina S.A.I.C. Cfmara Nacional en lo Federal, Sala
11 en lo Contencioso Administrativo 31 Agosto 1971. XXI Derecho Fiscal 623.
lt Argentine tax procedure law directs the court to disregard formalities in
interpreting this law and consider the "economic reality," making a focus upon tax
issues evolve into a consideration of the economic unit doctrine. Art. 11-12, Law
11.683.
tlRefinerias de Maiz, S.A. Fallos: 259:141.
tZThe Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is a limited liability company, es-
sentially a parallel to the English limited liability company, and to a lesser degree,
the close corporation in the United States.
13See note 4, supra.
14Convocatoria is a form of reorganization. When granted, the company ceases
payment of non-secured and non-preferential debts but continues business under its
own management with a court appointed referee who determines the amount of assets
and liabilities. A concordato follows; a creditor's agreement for the repayment of the
debts which must be approved by the court.
lt An 86 percent majority of creditors had approved the concordato. The objecting
creditor also asked that the liability of Cia. Swift be extended to the other Deltec
group companies and that a protective order be issued restraining Deltec from trans-
ferring other investments from the country, The judge denied the specific protective
order, but later issued a similar order on the basis of the court appointed referee's
report.
16The Company was attempting to negotiate sales of its meat extract to Deltec
group members in Europe, at prices stated by Deltec to be higher than similar con-
tracts of other Argentine meat producers. The sales of other producers were approved
by the Argentine government, which denied Cia. Swift's request for permission to
export the meat extract.
17The Case of Compaiiia Swift de La Plata, S.A.F. at 8. Non-published material
supplied by Deltec International in the author's files.
ISThe bankruptcy ruling itself was surprising, since the referee's report showed
assets far in excess of liabilities. These facts made the further declaration of all Deltec
Argentine subsidiaries as bankrupt even more surprising and certainly unnecessary
to protect creditors. More recent events, including the intervention of Ingenio La
Esperaza, a sugar mill and one of the Deltec group local holdings, and the introduc-
tion of a bill in Congress to expropriate Cia. Swift, lead to the suggestion of judicial
involvement in a preconceived plan to nationalize Deltec holdings. A further sub-
sidiary, Argentaria, a major Argentine linanciera, has been intervenered by the Central
Bank under authority of a law regulating financial institutions.
t9 The Court of Appeals, a week later, censured and fined the National Com-
mercial Court Judge for improper conduct in commenting on the case publicly at
banquets and during television appearances.
20 The members of the Supreme Court had been replaced after the March, 1973
election, at which time the Peronist regime returned to power. The new government
was not expected to be particularly sympathetic to many businesses which had operated
with reasonable freedom under General Ongania and, to a lesser degree, General
Lanusse.
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2tDeltec Argentina is the holding company for Deltec's investments in Argentina.
22The Court additionally ruled that Deltec Internatonal and the Argentine Deltec
group companies were joint and severally liable, rather than the more moderate ruling
of the lower court that those companies were contingently liable.
23The Company strongly opposed the price discrimination charge, challenging
both the actual prices and the source of the Court's information. The latter was
objected to on the grounds that the Court accepted a report of the National Meat
Board of Argentina which was not subjected to an evidentiary hearing and which
contained its own refutation.
24The appearance of members of the Deltee group as creditors does not subject
them to affirmative liability, but rather only to a denial of their claims as creditors.
The Supreme Court seemed to feel that their involvement in the case somehow sub-
jected them to the obligations of the bankrupt Cia Swift.
25The Court stated that "the benefit of exclusion would not be allowed when the
entity could not be distinguished," essentially refusing to accept traditional distinc-
tions which left Argentina without any mode of control over the entities.
Z6See note 19, supra.
27See Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967). See generally 38 ALR
3d 1102.
28Case Note, Zaist v. Olson, 42 Conn. B.J. 127 (1968).
Editor's Note: Following is a translation of the Deltec decision
prepared by the Editor-in-Chief for Deltec International Ltd.
Deltec's permission to publish the translation in the Lawyer of the
Americas for the benefit of the legal profession is gratefully
acknowledged, also the assistance of Doctors E. Elejalde and
0. Salas.
The explanatory notes and the bracketed material in the body of
the text were added by the translator to facilitate understanding
the English version. They are not included in the original
Spanish version.
C-705-XVI. Compafiia Swift de la Plata, S.A.
Frigorifica Creditor's Proceeding (Convocatoria)t
Supreme Court of the Nation
Buenos Aires, September 4, 1973
And, having reviewed the records, to wit: "Direct appeal (recrso
de hecho) 2 presented by Cia. Swift de la Plata, S.A. Frigorifica" in the
case "Compafila Swift de ]a Plata, S.A. Frigorifica re creditor's proceeding"
(file C-705); "Direct appeal presented by Jos6 R. Zurdo in the case
Compafifa Swift de la Plata, S.A. Frigorifica re creditor's proceeding (now
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a bankruptcy) file C.-665"; "Direct appeal presented by DELTEC IN-
TERNATIONAL, INC., Deltec Argentina S.A.M. and F. and ARGEN-
TARIA S.A. Cia. Financiera" in the case "Cia. Swift de la Plata S.A.F.
re creditor's proceeding" (file C.-724) ; "Direct appeal presented by Jos6
R. Zurdo in the record Cia. Swift de la Plata S.A.F. re incidente
3 within
the creditor's proceeding, art. 250 Argentine Code of Civil and Commercial
Procedure, challenge of (impugnaci6n)4 Jose R. Zurdo (Deltec Interna-
tional S.A.-file C-725"; "Direct appeal presented by Carlos R. S. Alconada
Aramburu et al in the case "Compafiia Swift de la Plata S.A. Frigorifica
re incidente art. 250, para. 2 of the Argentine Code of Civil and Com-
mercial Procedure, file 156.919." (file C.-695) ; and "Direct appeal pre-
sented by Jos6 R. Zurdo in the case "Compailia Swift de ]a Plata, S.A. re
incidente art. 250, para. 2 Argentine Code of Civil and Commercial Pro-
cedure, appeal of Jose R. Zurdo, file C-683.
And Whereas:
1. The scope of the conflicting interests involved, as well as the
characteristics of this proceeding - originating in a convocatoria, but
ultimately resulting in a bankruptcy - and it's multiple incidentes have
produced an unusual accumulation of documents in numerous files and
annexes, in which the issues raised, debated and resolved are not always
set out clearly, but, on the contrary, are often obscured by copious and
repetitious presentations requiring detailed clarification.
2. The various legal recursos submitted directly to this court will be
ruled upon separately, subject to the caveat that it has been necessary, as
a preliminary matter, to reconstruct the overall picture of the issues raised
on appeal.
3. The complaint s on fs.6 71/4 of Record C-705 will be considered
first. The above complaint refers to an extraordinary recurso filed by
Swift de la Plata S.A. Frigorifica on fs. 11.347 in the main case, which
recurso was denied on fs. 11.405 on 5 September 1972. Swift's recurso
was filed against a decision of Section "C" of the Commercial Court of
Appeals of Buenos Aires, dated 6 June 1972 (fs. 11.250), in which said
Commercial Court confirmed the bankruptcy of the movant [Swift].
Swift's extraordinary recurso was presented as a supplement to still
another recurso-(fs. 11.336). The latter was based on inapplicability of
the law,7 but had the same objective as the former. This fact [the supple.
mentary filing], as indicated by the Procurador General,8 is sufficient to
declare inapplicable the remedy sought. This is in accordance with well
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established jurisprudence,9 shared by this particular Court (Decisions
237:547; 239:195; 240:50; 259:288; 261:28, among many others). These
decisions confirm the insufficiency of the extraordinary recurso when it is
conditioned upon, or supplementary to another [recurso].
And, neither is the arbitrariness attributed to the decision of 6 June
1972 well founded, as alleged in the supplementary pleading presented by
the movant. Movant's allegations are limited to reciting differences in in-
terpretation from those reached by the judges below with respect to the
applicable civil law (Decisions 119:114; 123:375; 134:309; 194:394),
and with the conclusions reached by those judges in the exercise of their
official functions (arts. 100 and 101 of the National Constitution; Decisions
187:291; 189:307; 218:278; 238:186; 241:40, among many others.)
The jurisprudence of the Court is well established with respect to the
limits which must be exceeded in order to annul the rulings of inferior
judges. These limits have not been exceeded in the instant case inasmuch
as there is no evident departure from the solution contemplated by the law.
The judges a quo have substantiated amply the exercise of their judicial
powers with respect to the approval or rejection of the concordato'0 ; they
have also substantiated adequately their interpretation of art. 40 of Law
11.719. And, neither does the decision challenged fail to deal with the
defenses raised, nor with the proven facts. With respect to the doctrine11
established by the decisions of the Court (among them Decision 276:132),
the allegation made re issues not dealt with is not relevant, e.g. the differ-
ence claimed between the assets and liabilities of the convocatoria [sic].12
This is so for two reasons. First, because trial judges are not required to
consider exhaustively all matters raised by the parties (Decision 272:226).
A judicial decision does not lose its foundation through the failure of the
judge to deal with an issue raised by a party if it is obvious that consider-
ation of such an issue would not have affected the conclusion reached
(Decision 205:513). Secondly, because the interpretation given by the
Court a quo to its own powers under art. 40 of the controlling Bankruptcy
Law, and its opinion relative to the responsibility of the bankrupt for the
causes which motivated its bankruptcy render superfluos any other
consideration.
Accordingly, the complaint [Swift's] on fs. 71/74 of Record C-705
does not lie, and the deposit made on fs. 1 of the above record is forfeited.
The Procurador General shares our conclusion.
4. Secondly, the Court will review the complaint on fs. 75/96 of
Record C-665 relating to the extraordinary recurso presented by Jose R.
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Zurdo on fs. 11.286 in the main case. In this recurso Zurdo challenges the
decisions of the Commercial Court of Appeals a quo on fs. 11.263, 11.268
and 11.270.
Review of Zurdo's complaint forces this Court to detail certain pre-
vious matters relating to each one of the cases appealed. These will be
considered below:
a) The Commercial Court of Appeals a quo, in a decision on fs.
11.263/6 declared null the aclaratorial3 (fs. 10.613) of the National Judge
in a Court of First Instance. The original ruling on fs. 10.553 rejected the
concordato proposed by the insolvent [Swift] and decreed the company
bankrupt.
In the above mentioned aclaratoria the Bankruptcy Judge, at the
request of the already named creditor Jos6 R. Zurdo and in conformance
with the terms of his original decision [fs. 10.553], ruled that it was proper
to extend responsibility for the debts of Frigorifico Swift S.A.F. to "all
companies which comprise the group" (refers to the "Deltec Companies")
subject "to prior discussion (excusi6n)14 of the assets of the bankrupt
company."
But, if the decision on fs. 11.263, as stated by the Procurador General
in his report on fs. 129 et a], Record C-665, does not have the nature of
a final ruling within the terms of art. 14 of Law 48, a realistic appraisal
of the matter forces the conclusion that said decision [11.263], rendered
on the basis of the decision on fs. 10.553, results in irreparable damage to
the extent recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court. The above is based
on the extent of the economic prejudice it [i.e. 11.263] induces (Decisions
188:244,; 194:401); also, on the fact that the decision goes beyond the
individual interests of the parties and affects that of the community. All
the above forces this Court to recognize the existence of a major institu.
tional interest which justifies disregarding the formalistic aspects of the
case (Decisions 248:189 and 232).
Thus, recognizing the sufficiency of the federal issue presented, it is
proper to review the complaint. Based on the fact that the issues have been
sufficiently debated in the totality of the records reviewed, it is now proper
to proceed to the merits and rule on the complaint presented.
The decision on fs. 11.263 places special emphasis on the inviolability
of the right of defense in a trial. In this connection the first thing to bear
in mind is that the protection afforded by such a right is assured when
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the interested party is given the opportunity to present his defenses at the
appropriate procedural stages of the proceeding (Decisions 235:104; 241:
195). The protection afforded by the right of defense does not.cover the
negligence of the litigants (Decision 247:161). And, much less can the
right be invoked to delay judicial proceedings (Decision 193:847, Whereas
No. 6). The exercise of the right found in art. 18 of the National Con-
stitution must be compatible with the rights of other intervenors in the
proceedings, and principally with the social interest inherent in the efficient
administration of justice (Decision 190:124).
The decision of the Court a quo [Commercial Court of Appeals] on
fs. 11.250 states: "The existence of the so-called group (refers to the
"Deltec group") in the economic-financial and commercial spheres is
plainly evidenced in the record."
"This has been highlighted by the .Office of the Referee in extensive
and detailed reports, and in abundant and authentic documentation (fs.
3902 rev.: 4115/27; 4.135 rev.; 4.306 rev.; 4.368; 3.981/86).
"Truthfully, the above matter has not been put in issue by the bank-
rupt company. It is of no interest, insofar as the matter under consideration
is concerned, to delve into history nor to analyze in detail the interrela-
tionships to which the Referee refers. It is sufficient to point to the exist-
ence of a group of companies headquartered in this country and abroad
whose shares - practically in their totality- remain the property of the
entities which form the group, and to their direct and indirect linkages,
ultimately resulting in control by Deltec International. This is clearly
evident in the report of the Referee (in accordance with fs. cited) and
annexed documentation, in the Prospectus of Deltec International to its
shareholders and in the Report and Balance Sheet of Deltec International
1970, translated on fs. 4,017/77 and 4078/94. It is, also evident in Deltee
International's communication to its shareholders relative to the convoca-
toria (translation page 4096) in which that company refers to the fact
that the financial arrangements of 'our' company Swift de la Plata in
Argentina failed, and that .'we'are forthwith. addressing ourselves to the
pertinent Argentine tribunal to seek a convocatoria."
"It shouid be observed that in the above mentioned documentation
Deltec International repeatedly refers to 'its' subsidiaries,' to 'our prop-
erty' (per special fs. 4030 rev, fs. 4087/8), etc. Swift, 99% of whose
shares Deltec International owns, is listed as one of the above; also listed
are many other companies in Argentina and abroad, owned either directly
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or indirectly through other subsidiaries. By way of example it should be
noted that Swift is one of the subsidiaries which, directly or indirectly,
controls other subsidiaries, such as Compafiia de Navegaci6n Ganadera
y Comercial de Ganados (S.A.), Provita (S.A.), Tranvias El6ctricos de
Tucum~n (S.A.), Avicola y Ibri (S.A.)." Subsequently, the Court a quo
[Commercial Court of Appeals] states "a first thought suggested by the
situation described is that the bankrupt [Swift] is severely circumscribed
in regard to its freedom of action and in its commercial policies. This is
so because Swift - as already demonstrated - is closely linked to and
within the framework of a group of vast projections whose interests must
logically predominate and in whose commercial policies it [Swift] is
involved. This is clearly evident from the facts stated previously in this
paragraph; also from other concrete facts, e.g. more than 80% of Swift's
sales have been to the entities of the 'group,' including the totality of
the sales of cooked and frozen meats (fs. 3984 rev.), report of the National
Meat Board (Junta Nacional de Carnes) on fs. 10.030/1. In sales made
outside the 'group' there is noted a tendency to arrive at prices substan-
tially higher than those negotiated with members of the 'group' (fs.
3964/4 rev.; report of the National Meat Board, fs. 10.200/204). Other
facts follow: the policy followed with regard to the transfer of funds to
Provita (S.A.), the indebtedness of the latter for sums in excess of
$11,000,000, and its ['Provita's] financial difficulties to liquidate the debt
(fs. 4135, 4135 [sic.] and' 10.127) ; guarantee and discount of commercial
[documents] papers to Ibri in times of difficulty for Swift (fs. 4135, 4308,
in accordance with memorial No. 1361 of 4-14-70 in annex attached);
credit of Deltec Argentina (S.A.) in the amount of U.S. $3,093,000.69 to
guarantee the bankrupt's (Swift) loan with 'Deltec Banking Corporation
Ltd.' (fs. 4317/8) ; the requests of the entities of the group to recognize
their claims which amount to 37.66% of the totality of the claims (fs.
3962 and 4168); a notable reduction of debts with respect to the Deltec
group, and the withdrawal of funds by the latter in the last period (report
of the National Meat Board, fs. 10033 and 10123)."
These conclusive statements by the Court of Commercial Appeals are
in conflict with its resolution on fs. 11.267, where the same tribunal a quo
states, with excessive ritualism (Decision 268:71) that the facts mentioned
in the paragraph immediately above only call for a ruling with respect
to the bankrupt [Swift] and not with respect to the potential responsibilities
of the other entities of the group, especially Deltec International which is
mentioned as the predominant entity in the group. These statements by
the Commercial Court of Appeals totally omit consideration by that Court
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of the true nature of the juridical personality which, as this Court has
decided, must be taken into account "not only because of the abuses which
may arise from the complex relationships existing in certain social struc-
tures, but also from the growing scope of numerous groups of international
companies and the serious problems arising from their expansion" (in re:
Parke Davis y Cia Argentina S.A.C.I., appeal- Record P. -306-XVI).
Deltec International Limited recognizes that interrelationship in offi-
cial submissions in these proceedings, i.e. in the objection (incidente de
impugnacidn) filed by Mr. Jos6 R. Zurdo; and especially in the 1970
Annual Report wherein Deltec Internatiohal sets forth, in Notes 1 and 2,
the "principles of consolidation" and the offer to sell "the Argentine sub-
sidiary (Swift de la Plata)." In that report Swift is described as "the
subsidiary in which it [Deltec International] has a majority interest and
which carries out the meat operations in Argentina."
In the above objection, in which creditor Jos6 R. Zurdo challenged
the claims presented, Deltec International on fs. 278, Deltec Food Beneleux
(fs. 285 id), Deltec Foods Limited (fs. 280 id.) and Deltee Argentina S.A.
(fs. 279 id.) received official notifications.1 The last named company
answered that it was not a "debtor to which the objection applied"; the
others, that they were "not represented nor had an agency in Argentina."
Likewise they state that Mr. Ernesto Campos, a party to the proceedings,
answered "for himself" and "not in behalf of his principals," inasmuch
as he was only authorized to examine and verify claims, and to intervene
in the meeting of creditors (Junta). 16 In essence, the above named com
panics submit that the notifications should have been made to the com-
panies at their domiciles, i.e., Belgium, London and the United States, and
not to those parties present at the proceeding where claims were examined'
and verified.
This allegation is accepted in the decision on fs. 11.263. However,
contrary to that holding, it is noted, from a reading of the powers attached
to fs. 100/101, 111/113, 119, et al (authenticated on fs. 399, original
documents presented to the Office of the Referee) that the mandate to Mr.
Campos grants him more powers than those recognized in the decision
being challenged. Each mandate granted was given "to represent [the
principal] in all matters relating to the meeting of creditors re Swift de
la Plata S.A.F., with broad authority to request examination and verifica-
tion of claims, to offer and submit all types of evidence, represent the
undersigned in all types of incidentes, submit written documents and
petitions, participate and vote in meetings of creditors, challenge, reject
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and object to the claims of third parties, approve and reject concordatos
and compromises between Swift de ]a Plata S.A.F. and creditors, grant and
accept postponements and remission of debts, and, in general, carry out
all acts considered necessary or suitable to safeguard the interests of the
undersigned in any such acts."
This grant of powers, which was accepted and on the basis of which
the examination and verification of claims of the principals took place,
produces the results contemplated in arts. 49-51 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (arts. 1869, 1879 of the Civil Code), and with respect thereof
the doctrine established by the decisions of the Court, to wit: Decision
250:643 is applicable. In that case a mandate was granted to act in behalf
of a principal in a certain legal proceeding. The mandate included the
normal powers granted in a case of this nature, including the right of
appearance of the agent in the proceeding in question. The lower court
nevertheless ordered that the notification to the principal be made abroad.
An appeal was taken on this issue and granted on the grounds that there
was evidence of arbitrariness on the part of the lower court. The Supreme
Court found that the effects of the mandate granted served to vitiate the
ruling of the lower court on the grounds of excessive formalism, and re-
voked the decision below because it did not rest on proven facts, not
questioned in the course of the proceeding.
The above leads to the conclusion that the denial mentioned in the
decision on fs. 11.263 does not result from an unlawful, substantial or
effective restriction of the right of defense (Decision 189:306) but from
the sole negligence of the interested parties (Civil Code art. 1905). Thus,
the constitutional argument fails (Decision 239:51).
It is also well to bear in mind that when the Bankruptcy Judge in his
decision on fs. 9904, pursuant to art. 12 of Law 11.719 rejected the claims
of the Deltec group companies, he expressly declared that the responsibility
of the said companies would attach "only in the event of bankruptcy, in
which case all obligations become due" (Whereas No. 6).
Notwithstanding the above, the key factor to consider in deciding the
issue presented is that the legal regime of the juridical personality can not
be used to prejudice the paramount interests of society, nor the rights of
third parties. The means used by the State to prevent business associations
from existing as mere corporate shells vary and have different names, but
they all conform to economic and social realities and proclaim the su-
premacy of the law. It is obvious that the above acquires special relevance
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when the judges have to face the complex legal problems created by
business associations in the modern world. Today these associations are
characterized by their interdependence, linkages and their multi-national
nature. These factors, together with the difficulties attendant upon their
control, the increase in their influence and the interrelationships of their
administrative organizations- through real or apparent affiliates-
strengthens their power of concentration.
In the instant case the varied legal forms used by different factions
of the group [Deltec group], structurally merged under the control of
Deltec International Limited, should not produce a result in which only
one of the factions (Swift S.A.F.) - only formally different from the other
factions - should be the only entity affected by the judicial decision under
review. The Court has declared "that excessive reliance on juridical tradi-
tionalism is one of the most serious obstacles to economic expansion and
social justice." (Decision 264:410). Accordingly, the rationale of the law,
always an objective of justice, should not be confused with juridical ritual-
ism which tries to substitute and supplant the former.
These guidelines force this Court to take cognizance of the intricate
case under review, but prohibit it from accepting, through the formalistic
use of the legal structures constituting business associations, a concept
foreign to the objectives sought or to the social realities which should
legitimize such objectives.
These principles gain in importance when the economic interests of
the nation, seriously threatened by the interests and activities set forth in
the decision on fs. 11.250, become an issue. That decision reveals that the
economic and financial policies of the controlling group follow norms, not
only harmful to commercial interests but to the community in general. The
legal structures which the laws of Argentina provide for lawful activities
can not legalize economic and financial policies contrary to the needs of
our society, effectively recognized by the judiciary of the country.
Accordingly, the consequences of the bankruptcy decreed in the case
of Swift S.A.F. should also be imputed to Deltec International Limited as
the real debtor and responsible for the debts of the obvious bankrupt whose
property it owns and over which it exercises control. (Decision on fs.
11:250; report of the Referee on fs. 3961/63; 3981/86; 3987/4113/24;
report of the National Meat Board; fs. 10.033 and 10.123/4). We find
there exists a fusion of patrimonies even though the assets are in the name
of other title holders, yet to be determined in the appropriate proceeding,
but already singled out in the report of the Office of the Referee, particu-
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larly the assets of the affiliate Deltec Argentina S.A.F. and F., domiciled
in Cangallos 564, Buenos Aires, with respect to which the extension of
responsibility is fully applicable. This conclusion is unavoidable from a
review of the record in the instant case which evidences the certainty of
the facts in accordance with the precedents of the Supreme Court (Decision
275:389) which can not be ignored if fraud, the prevention of which is
the primary duty of judges, is to be avoided.
Upon declaring void, with the consequences set forth above, the
decision on fs. 11.263, it is well to also establish that the benefits of dis-
cussion (excusi6n) 17 which the Judge of First Instance improperly granted
should not be allowed to stand. This is so because having decided that the
companies forming the so called "Deltec Group" comprise, insofar as the
bankruptcy is concerned, a unified socio-economic entity with the bankrupt
company, the supplementary ruling found in the aclaratoria on fs. 10.613
conflicts with the main conclusion of the decision to such a degree that it
destroys its very substance. This is so because the decision under review
departs from the joint responsibility imposed by the Commercial Code
(arts. 304, 417, 443 and 480) ; also because recognition of the benefit of
discussion (excusin) implies recognition of the "Deltec Group" as a third
party, either as an assignee or guarantor. This can not be because one can
not be a self-guarantor; also, because as previously declared by the Court
(Decision 273:111), the benefit of discussion (excusi6n) is not available
when the individual assets can not be distinguished because the patrimonies
have become intermingled. Lastly, because the commercial nature of an
act of warranty, as well as the consequences of the bankruptcy decreed
would call for a different legal solution (arts. 480 Commercial Code and
2013, para. 5, Civil Code).
In view of the above, the Court admits the complaint and decrees that
the recurso presented on fs. 11.286 of the main case, insofar as it pertains
to the decision of the Commercial Court of Appeals on fs. 11.263, was
improperly denied. And no further substantiation being necessary, this
Court revokes the decision of the Commercial Court of Appeals on fs.
11.263 to the extent that it failed to extend to Deltec International Limited
and to Deltec Argentina S.A.F.M. responsibility for the bankruptcy of
Swift de ]a Plata S.A.F. (arg. art. 165, so called law 19.551).
And, in conformance with the express powers conferred by art. 16,
part 2 of Law 48 (Decisions 235:554 and 245:533) this Court decrees:
I. That the inclusion of the assets of Swift de la Plata S.A.F. in the
bankruptcy estate should also include the assets of the companies compris-
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ing the "Deltec Group," especially those of Deltee International Limited and
Deltec Argentina S.A.F. and M. (arts. 1, 3, 6, and 104 of Law 11.719)
report of the Referee fs. 3161/63, 3981/86, 4113/24; report of the National
Meat Board fs. 10.033 and 10.125/4).
II. That in the proper proceeding, there should be determined what
other persons or companies comprise the mentioned group [Deltec group]
to the extent that the latter comprises an economic unit with the bank-
rupt company.
III. That joint execution should be carried out with respect to all the
named assets without prior discussion (excusi6n) of the assets of Swift de
]a Plata S.A. Frigorifica (art. 73 et al and 104 Law 11.719 and arg. art.
170, so-called Law 19.151).
IV. That the natural or legal persons mentioned in Sections I and
II above, once having been designated as therein decreed, may exercise
those rights to which they are entitled through proceedings in exclusi6nt s
or restitution of assets. (arg. arts. 81 et al of the so-called Law 19.551).
Let there be notification and return of the deposit on fs. Y2 of Record
C-665.
b) The appellant also complains against the ruling on fs. 11.268 in
which the Commercial Court of Appeals revoked the ruling on fs. 9979
which imposed on the creditors being challenged [members of the Deltec
group] the costs pertaining to the incidente in question.
We now refer to the complaint grounded on the failure of the court
a quo [Court of Commercial Appeals] to resolve the issue in the appeal
of the movants dealing with that part of the decision on fs. 9979 pertain.
ing to costs. That decision ruled that the costs of the incidente"9 in question,
insofar as these pertained to the bankrupt, should be paid by that company
[Swift] in the order of priorities established. On this issue this Court
concurs with the Procurador General that the complaint should be dis-
missed. In effect, the complaint does not lie because subsequent to the
filing of the recurso on fs. 11.263, the Commercial Court of Appeals on
fs. 188 of the incidente which resulted in Record No. 156.730 of the
Register of the said court ruled on the matter. This ruling was challenged
opportunely by the same appellants through another extraordinary recurso
which will be considered below (Whereas No. 8, infra).
The remaining objections seek a revision of the interpretation given
to arts. 18, 26 and 27 of Law 11.719; they also question the arbitrariness
of the decision.
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We share the opinion of the Procurador with respect to the first
objections. We rule that these objections only raise matters of interpreta-
tion respecting the civil law, with the well-known results regarding the
instancia of art. 14 of Law 48.
But, it is believed that a federal question is raised by the remaining
objections. There is ground for complaint insofar as the decision on fs.
11.268 admits an interpretation under which costs should not be imposed
with regard to the issue raised in the challenge (incidente de impugnaci6n)
initiated by Mr. Jos6 R. Zurdo relating to the claims presented [by Deltee
group] (Record 31.503).
A review of the records reveals that there took place a total rejection
of the claims questioned by the movant [Zurdo] in accordance with art.
18 of Law 11.719. In the pertinent proceeding not only were the creditors
challenged legally defeated, but there was also a reaffirmance-recognized
in the final decision-of collusion by those who sought to establish their
particular claims. The parties were the subject of a ruling on fs. 9904
which rejected their claims because these "violated the concept of the
juridical person; were based on a simulation of juridical acts rejected by
the legal order, etc."
The matter decided by the court a quo is found among the exceptions
to the principle that matters pertaining to costs, to whom they should be
charged and the amount thereof is procedural and not subject to review
(Decisions 251:233 and others), except for alleged arbitrariness (Deci-
sions 250:431; 254:506). We find such arbitrariness in the instant case.
We therefore admit the complaint and rule that the costs of the incidente
initiated by Mr. Jos6 R. Zurdo (Record C-503 of the Registry of the Trial
Court) should be borne by the creditors challenged and legally defeated in
the proceeding. We so decree and order that the deposit made be returned.
Finally, the ruling on fs. 11.270 which nullified the implementation
of fs. 10.609, also challenged by the movant Zurdo, is without legal effect
in accordance with the above ruling. The Court a quo should proceed
opportunely to set the fees. It is so decreed.
5) Thirdly, the Court will consider the complaint presented by Deltec
International Limited, Deltec Argentina S.A.F. and M., and Argentaria
S.A. (Record C-724) relating to the extraordinary recurso filed on fs.
242 of Record No. 156.57 of the Registry of the National Commercial
Court of Appeals.
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This Court shares the opinion of the Procurador General, also in
conformance with well established jurisprudence of this Court, to the effect
that procedural matters, such as the one under review, are not, in principle,
within the ambit of an extraordinary recurso. Additionally, it does not
appear that the complaint involves any of the exceptions subsequently
considered in item 7 below. These exceptions permit a departure from the
rule under which rulings pertaining to preventive measures are not avail-
able in the special proceedings provided for in article 14, Law 48 (Decision
247:553).
Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed and the deposit made by the
movant is forfeited.
6) Fourthly, the Court will consider the complaint presented by
Mr. Jos6 R. Zurdo in Record C-723 relating to the recurso presented on
fs. 260 of the Record "Cia. Swift de la Plata S.A.F. re incidente involving
article 250 of the Code of Civil Procedure which arose during the
convocatoria." (Record 156.657 of the Registry of the National Com-
mercial Court of Appeals).
As properly pointed out by the Procurador General, the well estab
lished jurisprudence of this Court holds, as a matter of principle, that
matters relating to the responsibility for costs are not within the ambit
of extraordinary proceedings (instancias). (See Whereas 4c. supra.) There
is nothing in the case under review which would justify a departure from
the general rule above. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed and the
deposit made is forfeited.
7) Fifthly, the Court will consider the recurso appearing on fs. 915
of Record C-695 presented by Carlos R. S. Alconada Aramburu and
Federico G. Polk, in their own names, re the challenge presented on fs. 67
of Record 156.919 of the Registry of the National Commercial Court of
Appeals. The above challenge was directed against a ruling on fs. 64 of the
above record which revoked the rulings on fs. 10.052 rev. and 10.054
rev. concerning measures ordered to safeguard the payment of costs and
contained in the ruling on Is. 9979 of the main case.
The matter already decided with respect to the federal question raised
by the ruling on fs. 11.268/9 of the Commercial Court of Appeals, and
pertaining to the decision on the subject of costs in the incidente in which
Mr. Jos6 R. Zurdo challenged the claims of other creditors (Record 31503),
is controlling here. This is in accordance with the ruling of the Procurador
General. Accordingly, the complaint lies and we resolve the recurso
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presented by nullifying the ruling challenged for legal insufficiency. In
effect: the preventive measures decreed to safeguard the payment of costs
do not require the fixing of costs (art. 34 of Decree - Law 30.439, ratified
by Law 12.997), nor payment (arts. 63 and 212 para. 1 Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure). Additionally, the terms of decision 1.1.268/69
do not exclude costs. Similarly, the imposition of costs in the decision on
fs. 64 appears unreasonable inasmuch as the petitioners had the right to
request such costs. In the light of the above, the complaint is admitted; the
decision appealed is revoked; and the deposit made is ordered returned.
8) Sixthly and finally, this Court will examine the direct appeal
filed by Mr. Jos6 R. Zurdo on fs. 13/22 of Record C-683 re the recurso
presented on fs. 194 of Record 156.730 of the Registry of the National
Commercial Court of Appeals against the decision on fs. 188 of the same
record. The latter decision ruled on the appeal taken against that part of
the decision on fs. 9979 in the main case which "declared that costs should
be borne by the bankrupt in the order of priorities established, subject to
the provisions of art. 71 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure.
20
This refers to the issue already considered in Whereas 4b, second
paragraph of this decision. This Court shares the ruling of the Procurador
in the sense that the decision raises a federal question inasmuch as it rules
on costs relating to the incidente in which the claims of creditors challenged
were dealt with in Record 31.513.
The ruling of this Court in Whereas 4a supports our holding that the
system (rigimen) of costs, as a matter of principle excluded from federal
remedies, finds in the instant case an exception to the general rule. It is
not only the fact that the decision which declares the payment of costs per
the order established, and charges the costs of appeal to the movant can
not find support in the decision on fs. 11.268/9 (different parties and
procedural situations), but that decision [11.268/9] has been annulled in
this decision, Whereas 4b. Accordingly, the complaint should be admitted
and with regard to the recurso presented, this Court decrees that the deci-
sion appealed should be nullified on the grounds of arbitrariness, inasmuch
as the costs of the incidente challenged should be imposed on the
convocatoria. (sic) 2 1 Notify and return.
MIGUEL ANGEL BERCAITZ - AGUSTIN DIAZ BIALET - MANUEL
ARAUZ CASTEX - ERNESTO A CORVALAN NANCLARES.
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TRANSLATOR NOTES
Convocatoria- A proceeding in which a merchant requests from the competent
court, among other things, a meeting of creditors in order to prevent a declaration
of bankruptcy.
2 Recurso- A formal written statement presented to a court in which the movant
seeks modification, revocation or interpretation of a judicial decision from the court
which rendered the decision, or a superior tribunal. Recursos are, as a rule, spe-
cifically designated to indicate the purposes they serve. For example, a recurso de
aclaracidn (recarso to clarify) seeks clarification of a ruling or decision which the
movant finds obscure, ambiguous, etc,; a recarso de apelacion is an appeal.
In civil law tradition an appeal is normally addressed to the court which rendered
the decision, i.e., it is a request to that court to allow the case to be brought before
a superior tribunal. If the request (appeal) is denied, the aggrieved party has the
right to resort to the higher tribunal directly. In certain jurisdictions this remedy is
called a recurso de hecho, i.e. a direct appeal to the higher court.
3Incidente-A collateral issue or controversy arising during the course of a
judicial proceeding. The nature of the issue raised may be used to further describe
the incideate, e.g., an incidente de nulidad arises when a party questions the validity
of a ruling by the Court. The issue may then be formally raised through the appro-
priate recurso. In this instance, a recurso de nulidad.
The phrase convocatoria - incidente means that the incidente in question arose
during the course of the convocatoria.
41mpugnacidn - A formal challenge; objection.
5Queja - Here translated as complaint in the absence of any modifying term in
the Spanish text. Legally, the term is narrower and is usually associated with recarso,
e. g. recurso de queja which has varied meanings in different civil law jurisdictions.
6fs.-Abbreviation for the Spanish word joias (archaic) meaning pages. It is
customary in certain civil law jurisdictions to cite to the appropriate page. The
abbreviated Spanish term will be used throughout this translation.
71naplicabilidad de Ley - Grounds for a specific recurso complaining of violation
or misapplication of the law by a court.
SProcurador General -Official of the State representing the latter in the pro-
ceeding.
9Jurisprudencia-The case law of the Court. It should be recalled that the
principle of store decisis does not prevail in the civil law tradition to the extent that
it does in the common law tradition. In this instance the Supreme Court is stating
that this particular Supreme Court shares the opinion of prior Supreme Courts. In
essence, it is affirming prior decisions on point, but with the fine distinction that-
if it took a contrary view-it could do so without distinguishing prior cases. Thus,
throughout the translation the use of the term "this Court (esta Corte) when referring
to the Supreme Court now sitting vis-&-vis "the Court" (la Corte) when referring to
previous Supreme Courts.
tOConcordato -The proposal by the management to the creditors for the pay-
ment of debts which must be approved by the Court to avoid bankruptcy. It is a
stage within the convocatoria. Rejection by the creditors or the Court results in
bankruptcy.
tlDoctrina de Fallos-The pronouncements of the court prior to reaching the
resolutory part of a particular decision.
THE PARKE DAVIS AND DELTEC CASES
1
2
There appears to be a typographical error in the Spanish text. The word con-
vocatoria has been apparently substituted for convocataria, i. e. the bankrupt (Swift].
1
3Aclaratoria-A decision or ruling by a court, at the request of one of the
parties, to clarify a previous decision or ruling. See recurso de actaraci6n, note 2,
.Sp70.
I4Excusi n "Discussion," Black's Law Dictionary, 554 (4th ed., 1951).
tsNotificaci6n - Notice; service of process.
6Janta -A meeting of creditors contemplated by the convocatoria, i.e. a partic-
ular stage within the convocazoria. It is at the Junta where, among other things, the
examination and verification of the creditor's claims take place.
1TNote 14, supra.
t5
Exclusion-A remedy looking to the separation of entities, joined for any
particular reason or as a consequence of a legal act or decision, from each other.
19"This incidente is found in Record No. 31.505 of the Registry of the Trial
Court." This particular wording is included in the text of the decision, but is placed
here to avoid confusion which may result from the translation of a very compressed
and complex ruling by the Court. The wording apparently is introduced in the de-
cision to complete the record, but is deemed not to have any substantive value.
2DArt. 71, Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure. "If the results of the trial or
incidente were partially favorable to both litigants, the costs will be shared, or will




Note 12, supro, is applicable.
